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Drafting Wills and Trust Instrumentst
BY STANLEY

H.

JOHNSON*

Errors, usually of omission, are all too frequent in the drafting of
wills and trust instruments. Where a mistake has been made in a contract or a deed, it may ordinarily be corrected, but a tetstamentary instrument is put away in a secret place and seldom reviewed. Furthermore, it
is apt to dispose of more property. It should therefore be prepared with
considerable forethought and care, and with full consideration of all the
contingencies and problems which may arise.
Unfortunately, the testator or settlor too often is in the greatest
haste and the draftsman has not had sufficient experience in the problems
of administration to turn out an air tight instrument under pressure.
The following comments are offered in the hope that they may be of
practical value, for they are drawn from actual instances which have
occurred.
The simplest instrument is the will providing for outright distribution. Let us consider it first.
A few individuals, afflicted with a disease which might be termed
willfulness, lie awake nights planning amendments to their wills. The
only known cure is the application of a higher fee on each appearance of
the symptom, a prescription which attorneys often find embarrassing.
Most testators, however, have only a sketchy notion of what they want.
It must be short and snappy and free from all that legal stuff.
There is no harm in a short will drafted in clear language provided
it contains what is needed. One will, about two-thirds of a legal page
in length, now being administered, disposed of a considerable amount of
real estate. Though in other respects well done, it neglected to give the
executor power of sale. For every parcel sold the tiresome statutory procedure must be followed. Whether the testator likes it or not, the attorney should make certain that everything needed is included.
It is desirable to have the testator state in the opening declaration
the place of his domicile, since his intention will be of some purport in
tSummary of address before the Denver Bar Association on May 7, 1945.
*Of the Denver bar, formerly district judge, now Trust Officer, The International
Trust Company.
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settling taxes. The use of the word "testament" with "will" is probably
tautological, but a statement that all former wills and codicils are revoked is important, since without it prior instruments are revoked only
where inconsistent.'
A reference to the payment of debts and funeral expenses is unnecessary, though commonly included, but the direction to pay, as an expense of administration, all death taxes is important to assure the full
-mount of a gift to any beneficiary. Attorneys all too frequently omit
this clause. It should be extended to include taxes against other transfers
in contemplation of, or to take effect after death, which are not properly
a part of the estate inventory; as for example, insurance not payable to
the estate, savings bonds payable to alternate payees, and property held
in joint tenancy.
The first gift should be of the testator's personal belongings. Let
him provide a first and a contingent legatee, for the sale of personal belongings is an unprofitable nuisance. This paragraph is often wordy.
"Chattels" is sufficiently comprehensive and avoids trivial constructions,
such as whether the words "articles of personal adornment" includes a
watch.
The specific legacies or devises follow. The beneficiary's address
and degree of relationship, if any, should be given. If one gift is to be
given preference over another, it should be clearly stated. If a spouse
receives less than half, and elects to exercise the statutory option, the
remaining gifts will be prorated. 2
There is some difference of opinion in the matter of specific gifts
whether the executor has any duty to pay property taxes. Some believe
he is obliged to pay those which were a lien at the testator's death, and
only these are deductible from death taxes. Certainly the executor is not
authorized to pay subsequent taxes nor to take any steps to perfect title.
If the testator wishes it, provision had better be made in the will. At
least, the executor or his attorney should see that estate documents necessary to make title merchantable in the devisee are recorded, not overlooking the decree of final discharge. There are many estates still uncompleted
in the Denver County Court, because the final discharge has never been
obtained.
Real estate may have been turned into the residue. In this event it
is important that the executor be given power of sale, since there may be
a dozen devisees living in as many states, or, again, the personal property
may be insufficient to pay expenses. The executor should be given more
than this. If he is not to be trusted, he should not be named. If he is, he
should receive full power at his discretion to hold, manage, improve, par'Whitney
vs. Hanington. 36 Colo. 407.
2
Buckley vs. Switzer, 69 Colo. 176.
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tition, invest, reinvest, sell, exchange, convey, lease, mortgage, contract
with respect to the property, both real and personal, free from the investment restrictions imposed by law, including the right to distribute to
beneficiaries in cash or in kind at his own valuations, hold property in
his own name or in the name of a nominee, make distribution to minors
without the intervention of a guardian, or pay out on their account, and
retain property not usually selected as a trust investment in spite of inadequate diversification. The same powers should be granted the trustee, if
there is one.
If the widow is to receive less than half of the estate, the matter had
better be discussed with her and a clause incorporated that, if she takes
her half, she shall take nothing under the will and the balance be distributed as therein provided. It has been held,3 however, that her election
does not invalidate the remainder of the will.
After disposition of the residue, provision should be made to cover
the contingency of all residuary beneficiaries predeceasing the testator;
for example, to the testator's heirs at law under the statutes of descent
and distribution in Colorado, or to a charity. Under a Colorado statute,
and a declaration of trust of a number of banking houses on file in the
office of the Secretary of State, gifts to general charitable uses in Denver
may be made to The Denver Foundation merely by incorporating by
4
reference the declaration of trust in the will.
Sometimes the testator may wish his wife to act as co-executor, in
order to retain some control. It -is less troublesome to administration to
provide that no sale or purchase of investments shall be made without
her approval, without naming her co-executor. A successor executor
should be provided, in case the first named cannot act.
If possible, the client with a small estate should be discouraged
from splitting it into minute fragments, particularly where there is a
wife or child dependent on him. In such cases it is better to bestow a life
estate upon that individual in trust, distributing largesse from the remainder.
The attestation clause is unnecessary in a will, but helpful, nevertheless, in that it provides a guide to proper execution. It is also prima
facie evidence of what it recites. " If separate date lines are incorporated
above the testator's signature and in the attestation clause, care should be
taken to make certain that they coincide. If a correction is made, it
should be initialled by the testator and the witnesses, as should every
page of the will except the signature page.
'Mitchell vs. Hughes, 3 CA 43.
'Books 245, p. 1; 294, p. 329: 267, p. 254; 403, p. 276.
'Butcher vs. Butcher, 21 CA 416, 423; H. B. 759, Session Laws of Colo., 1945,
approved April 11, 1945.
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It is well to advise the testator that his will is revoked by his remarriage, and pro tanto by the birth of a child, unless he has provided for
his unborn children, and that lapsed legacies fall into the residue, unless
a contingent legatee is named.
Testamentary Trusts
It is in wills containing testamentary trusts that trouble more commonly occurs. The draftsman must be very watchful, particularly where
distributions are made to children at various ages.
It is usually more sensible to give the widow the income from a
trust estate for life with the right in her trustee to invade principal for
her benefit, than to leave her half the estate. She is often incompetent to
make her own investments. Taxes will be saved against her estate. And
if there are children she will have control of their income, though sometimes this may be embarrassing. If the remainder is to go to charity,
however, a clause should be added stating that the trustee at his discretion may use principal only to the extent necessary to maintain her in
the standard of living she has enjoyed in the testator's lifetime, or in
some standard which may be measured. Otherwise, the entire principal
will be taxed. 6
Provision should be made for payment of her burial expenses and
also for payments for her benefit in the event of her incapac ity. 'Unless
the estate is large, any specific gifts to others should be effective after her
death, rather than before.
Usually, if there are children, the remainder distributes to them.
The trustee, to avoid the expense of guardianship, should be empowered
to pay to or for the benefit of minors, without a guardian. The testator
should be discouraged from distributing to his children at too remote a
period. If they are apt to be unreliable, they had better not receive principal at all, though the rule against perpetuities must be observed. The
period of distribution in such cases may be sufficiently extended by taking as the lives in being a handful of babies, whether related to the testator or not, although this situation in due course will drive the trustee to
despair.
If a child is to receive distribution of half of his portion at thirty
years and half at forty years, be certain that three contingencies are covered. First, in the event the child dies before thirty with or without
issue; second, in the event he dies after thirty and before forty with or
without issue; and third, in the event he dies before the life tenant with
or without issue. In two substantial estates now being administered, intestacy has resulted from a failure to observe these conditions.
'Merchants Bank vs. Commissioner, 320 U. S. 256, but see Com. vs. Robertson,
141 Fed. (2) 855.
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Where income or a specified sum is payable monthly or quarterly
to a beneficiary for life, any portion undistributed at the date of death
should go to the next in line; otherwise, it is presumed payable to the
life beneficiary's estate. 7 The rule, however, for no good reason, is otherwise with annuities.
If separate funds are to be set up for a number of children, the
trustee should have the right to treat them as one fund until distribution.
If the words "separate funds for each child of mine, and the descendants
collectively of any deceased child" are used, the contingency of after-born
children will be taken care of. The words "children" and "issue" or
"descendants" are not the same. The first refers to one generation only;
the latter two may refer to several generations, including adopted and
illegitimate children. Testator's are apt to overlook a son's wife and, in
the event of his death, to leave everything to his children. It might be
mentioned that the testator's grandchildren will fare better if the mother
is not compelled to earn her living.
It may be desirable to allow the testator's spouse to make distribution to the children after his death by a power of appointment, by will
or otherwise. Such a power, if confined to distribution among a class
consisting of the spouse of the decedent, or his or the spouse's descendants, including adoptive children, is not taxable a second time against the
donee's estate. Beyond this class it is, and the second tax cannot be
avoided by making the spouse co-trustee with some disinterested person,
if she retains discretionary power over principal.s Recipients of this
power who have not exercised it have until July, 1945, to release it
without tax, under the Federal Estate Tax laws, and by a new act in
Colorado have an indefinite period to release from Colorado tax. The
power to control distributions of principal is not taxable against a disinterested trustee, but it is a difficult one to exercise.
A spendthrift clause, providing that the trustee may pay only into
the beneficiaries' hands, and that the trust fund or its income shall not
be subject to attachment or other court order is sometimes desirable, but
its legal effect has apparently not been determined in Colorado.
Pains should be taken over the clause granting the trustee his powers. He has no implied power of sale of real or personal property unless
expressly given him. The trust will continue subject to the jurisdiction
of the probate court unless the instrument states otherwise. This rule
is often overlooked. Court jurisdiction is only useful where there may
be trouble requiring court determination, in which event, it is cheaper to
remain under the wing of the court.
'II Scott on Trusts #238 et seq.
'C. C. H. Ed. of I. R. Code amended to 10/1/44, Sec. 811 F.

128

DICTA

Difficulties arise over the allocation of income. If the testator
wishes his wife to enjoy all the income from a 3 % bond, bought by the
trustee at a premium, he had better say so. Otherwise the trustee will be
required to amortize the premium from income over the life of the bond
to its call date. In that case the wife's income may be cut in half. Similarly, if he desires his wife to have all the income from the estate, he had
better not leave her only the income from the residue, which is something
less. The rule of equitable apportionment probably is the law in Colorado, and that portion of income earned by the excess of the estate over
the residue during administration under this rule is distributable into
principal.
If there is a possibility that the testator will leave a mortgage upon
real property, the executor or trustee should have power to amortize it
from principal first, if any, and, if not, from income. Otherwise, he may
be forced to collect from the remainderman, and if the remainderman has
no money the property will be lost.
Trust Agreements
There may be a situation in which a trust agreement effective during the settlor's life is preferable to a will, even though the probate fees
may be lost for all time. The doctor who is too busy, or has inadequate
investment knowledge to take care of his estate; the wealthy individual
who wishes to save taxes by a present irrevocable gift; and more particularly the older person who faces the possibility of incompetency-these
may effect a saving and an advantage by incorporating a testamentary
disposition in a declaration of trust.
With two exceptions, an instrument of this nature does not vary
greatly in its problems from the testamentary trust contained in a will.
First, the settlor must be provided for. The draftsman should see to it
that his trustee may care for him during incapacity, may pay his funeral
expenses and his creditors upon his death. Secondly, it must be remembered that a trust instrument is irrevocable unless it states to the contrary. 9 The settlor should retain full power of amendment, as well as
revocation, and since ihere have been decisions that power of amendment,
once exercised, is lost, be should be expressly permitted to amend as often
as he pleases. Needless to say, if the trust is to be irrevocable, the draftsman must exercise great caution. Irrevocable trusts should be discouraged.
Occasionally an estate may include an interest in a partnership or
family corporation. In the former, the executor, or trustee if there is one,
should have power to reinvest the decedent's share in the business as a
limited partner, for purposes of liquidation. In the latter, he should be
'III Scott on Trusts #329 et seq.
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empowered to vote the stock, qualify as an officer or director, or if it may
seem preferable, these rights may be bestowed upon some other person,
perhaps a member of the family more familiar with the business.
In connection with wills and trusts, a word might be said about the
policies of the Denver banks conducting trust departments. It is their
practice, when consulted concerning a will or trust instrument, to assist
in drafting only through the client's own attorney. When the instrument is executed, the original or a copy is deposited in a sealed envelope
in the bank's vault with the name of the attorney upon the envelope.
In all instances the attorney is accepted as the attorney for the estate,
unless the testator has had a later will or codicil drawn by a new attorney,
or has left written directions that another attorney should be employed.
This rule is strictly adhered to. It should be observed by attorneys who
may be called in by the beneficiaries.
Sometimes the banks are named without their knowledge. It is
preferable to submit a preliminary copy of the instrument to a trust officer of the bank, if possible, and to provide him with a final copy to
deposit in the bank vault.
In summary, it may be said that the drafting of wills and trust
instruments requires in the first instance a knowledge of possible contingencies and problems, and in the second, care in the use of language and
its application to the contingencies and problems. It is well to build up
and revise from time to time a form. Wherever possible, the first draft
should be set aside-not like Macauley's History for a year or more, but
for two or three days at least. When it is read again, before the final
draft, it should be scanned with a critical eye for mistakes, and not with
a mind to engage in self-congratulatory exploration.

.. Let's Finish the Job..
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Some Footnotes to the 1945 Statutes
BY ROYAL C. RUBRIGHT*

Certain Session Laws passed by the 1945 legislature which have a
more or less direct bearing upon real estate titles are proper subjects for
some comment.
We note that the inadvertent joker in Section 1 of Chapter 136 of
the Session Laws of 1943 has been repealed by Senate Bill No. 316. As
of April 3, 1945, the publication of a legal notice no longer need be
made in the "county where the subject matter of the legal notice or advertisement is located," but the publication shall be made in the county
where required by law or by the Rules of Civil Procedure or the rules of
court applicable thereto. If your publication conformed to the statute or
to the Rules of Civil Procedure or to the rules of court, and you did not
in addition publish in a county where the subject matter (real estate)
was located, you appear to be safe from attack provided no action is
brought prior to October 3, 1945, to set aside or question your proceedings.

House Bill No. 109 has made some technical corrections in connection with estate proceedings. The amendment to Section 253 of Chapter
176, 1935 C. S. A., which becomes effective July 4, 1945, makes some
definite changes and presents at least five new problems.
I.
The first problem is that involving the form of verification of a
waiver of notice in a proceeding to sell real estate. The old form of
waiver was prescribed by 1935 C. S. A. Suppl. Chapter 176, Section
167. The person executing the waiver "subscribed and swore" to the
verification. In all of the other proceedings involving probate matters
the form of verification was an acknowledgment. The new statute by
the amendment to Section 253 contemplates that the waiver shall be "by
an instrument duly acknowledged." The effect of the new statute is to
make the verification the same for all estate proceedings. It should be
noted, however, that all the old forms which read "subscribed and
sworn to" must be changed after the effective date of the new act, which
is July 4, 1945.
II.
The second problem created by House Bill No. 109 is how much
preliminary effort to obtain personal service must be made before service by publication can be had.
A. Proceeding to Sell Real Estate.
*Of the Denver bar.
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As far as a proceeding to sell real estate is concerned the old statute,
Section 166, Chapter 176, 1935 C. S. A. provided substantially that
service could be had by publication (a) because the person could not be
found in the State of Colorado, or (b) if he resides out of the state, or
(c) any other reason.
Under Section 253 as amended in 1945 you are required to serve
persons in interest (a) personally if they can be found in the State of
Colorado, or (b) personally or by mail if.they can be found and, served
outside the State of Colorado.
The change is that whereas formerly you were able to publish
against those outside the State of Colorado, now you must serve them
either by mail or by personal service if you are able to do so.
The new Section 253 in Subdivision (c) provides that the Rules
of Civil Procedure shall apply except to the extent that the procedure
set forth in Chapter 176 is different. In other words, if there are any
gaps or incomplete statements of procedure in Chapter 176, we should
turn to the Rules of Civil Procedure for the proper method to be followed. With this guiding principle in mind, let us consider the question:
Who is to determine whether the persons in interest in a proceeding to
sell real estate "can be found and served outside the State of Colorado"?
In nearly all cases the papers in the estate proceedings give the names of
the heirs and a street address, or a city and state as an address. It is reasonably apparent that each one of these persons could be served by mail
or by personal service, and the spirit of the new statute apparently requires that such persons must.be so served. The new statute would seem
to provide that you cannot serve non-residents of-Colorado by publication unless you are in fact unable to serve them by mail or by personal
service. If a petition for letters of administration or a petition for probate gives a city and state, or a street address within a city, as the address
of persons in interest, you could not honestly say that those persons
could not be served by mail or by personal service unless some definite
effort had been made either by mailing the notice, which was subsequently not delivered, or by making effort to obtain service by a local
sheriff. Unless the files in the estate affirmatively show that either of such
steps were taken, service by publication would be of questionable validity. Because the very jurisdiction of the court is based on the proper
compliance with statutes relating to service, it is vitally important that
the statute be followed strictly. In the ordinary situation outlined above,
it would seem necessary that you file a motion requesting service by publication and setting forth specifically and in detail why you are unable to
serve non-residents by mail or by personal service. The statute would
further seem to require that a court order should be obtained, based on
the motion, and which authorizes service by publication.

132

DICTA

It must be realized that the procedure which is outlined above is.
not necessarily that prescribed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 4
provides that non-residents may be served by publication. It will be seen
that the procedure in estate matters is now more difficult and burdensome
than that in the ordinary civil action. However, for the reason stated
above, it seems necessary for some sort of court order to be obtained upon
some kind of motion supported by some evidence or testimony. I submit
that the County Court has inherent powers which must be broad enough
to permit the motion and order suggested.
This procedure, it will be seen, is considerably more complicated
than required under the former statute; but because Section 166 was
expressly repealed, you definitely cannot use the old affidavit for publication.
B. Proceeding to Admit Will to Probate.
Exactly the same considerations apply to citations to attend probate
of a will and the same procedural steps outlined above must be followed
in obtaining service of a citation to attend probate. (You will note that
House Bill 109, Section 10, expressly repeals Section 51, Ch. 176, 1935
III.
C. S. A.)
The next problem is the number of publications required. In
regard to the sale of real estate, the old statute, 1935 C. S. A., Chapter
176, Section 166, required publication for two successive weeks and the
notice was uniformly published three times. The new statute requires
notice shall be published "once each week during each of four successive
calendar weeks." In Section b of the new statute the quoted portion of
the last sentence is defined as four publications. You will note that at
least five days must elapse between any two publications and at least 19
da.ys must elapse between the first and last publication. This requirement
necessitates new forms of publisher's affidavits to comply with the new
IV.
statute.
The next problem is that involved in what kind of notice is published. As far as probate of a will is concerned, the old statute, 1935
C. S. A., Chapter 176, Section 51, a notice was required to be published
which contained at least five elements and was rather lengthy. The new
statute requires the "citation" to be published. In this latter respect the
new statute appears to simplify the old procedure.
V.
There is a collateral matter connected with all estate proceedings
which involves the service of process on a non-resident minor. By the
adoption of the new Section 253, a blanket rule was made that matters
not covered specifically in the estates chapter (1935 C. S. A., Chapter
176) would be governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Since Rule
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4 (f) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, Chapter 1, was amended effective
February 28, 1945, it is now possible to serve a non-resident minor
under the age of 18 by personal service.
In regard to House Bill No. 498, Section 7-as one Robert Burns
indicated, the best laid plans of mice and men go awry. The inheritance
tax department, with the very commendable desire to cut red tape and to
simplify the payment of inheritance taxes, encouraged the passage of
Section 7, House Bill No. 498, which amended Section 38 of Chapter
85, 1935 C. S. A., as amended by Section 5, Chapter 116, Session Laws
of 1943. The intent of the 1945 statute was to limit the inheritance
lien for a period of 15 years from the date of death and to abolish the
perpetual lien which had existed from 1909. Unfortunately, the 1945
amendment is not effective because our present statute was passed in
1933. In that year, the legislature amended all of the former laws, but
they did not abolish the liens which then existed. The 1945 amendment
states that the tax imposed by "this chapter shall be and remain a lien
• . . for 15 years from date of death". The words "this chapter" refer
to the 1933 statute, and the 1933 statute specifically did not abolish
liens which existed before 1933. Therefore the 1945 statute does not
affect liens which existed prior to 1933. Since 15 years has not
elapsed since 1933, there is no actual limitation in effect and the perpetual lien of inheritance taxes will still exist until 1948 unless the
next legislature remedies the situation.
There is one other statute in which well-intentioned plans did not
materialize.
Senate Bill No. 171 was designed to limit the lien of an unredeemed tax sale to a period of 15 years. However, Section 1 of the
statute refers only to tax certificates which are not issued or assigned to
a city or county or a district levying such taxes.
It is difficult to see how anyone can say positively, for example,
that an unredeemed tax sale certificate issued to John Jones in 1921 for
the general taxes of 1920 is barred. John Jones may at any minute
assign the certificate back to the county or to the city or to the taxing
district. It is common knowledge that assignments of tax certificates
are seldom recorded until the holder applies for treasurer's deed. In
view of this widespread practice, the mere fact that the abstract does
not show an assignment is not conclusive. If such assignment has been
made, or will be made, the 15-year limitation is not applicable and the
lien of the certificate is not barred.
With this loophole in the statute, it seems highly doubtful if a
lawyer examining an abstract of title can pass an unredeemed tax sale
certificate even though it is more than 15 years old,
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Federal Taxation of Trust Income
GEORGE T.

EVANS*

Under what circumstances may the United States tax the income
of a trust as though, in fact, the trust were actually a corporation? For
an answer one must go to the books and attempt to reconcile not only
literally dozens of conflicting decisions; but, also, to try to "square"
them with the law itself. Because of the anomalous views in the
several lesser Federal jurisdictions, the Supreme Court of the United
States took up for review four cases' involving the above question and
tried, in deciding them in 1935, to lay the attendant errors and misconceptions. Since then chaos in the lower courts has been complete.
Not overlooking the unflattering classification to which tradition
and the ancient experience of mankind assigns one who rushes in where
angels dare not tread, the writer, never-the-less, meekly ventures the
suggestion that, perhaps, the situation above outlined results from
failure to give effect to the applicable revenue statutes, (the expressed
will of Congress in this behalf) and to a rule of law from which the
Supreme Court has never departed.
In order to get perspective we must examine the first two Supreme
Court decisions ever handed down on the right of the United States
to tax trusts as corporations. We start, then, with the Supreme Court's
opinion in a case decided in 19192 where a trust had been formed in
connection with the dissolution of a corporation, so that the proceeds
of the sale of certain properties might be distributed to beneficiaries
within a period left to the discretion of the trustees. The Court noted
that the beneficiaries had "no control over the fund,"-3 and from that
the Bureau of Internal Revenue jumped to the conclusion that if the
cestuis que trust did "have a voice in the conduct of the business of the
trust, whether through a right periodically to elect trustees or otherwise,
4
the trust is an association within the meaning of the statute."Thus was born the illegitimate5 so called "control" test for determining the status of a trust for Federal tax purposes. That the test
was based upon an invalid assumption, drawn from dictum and not
upon the principle intended, is clear from the following excerpt from
the decision:
*Of the Denver Bar.
'Morrissey et al. v. Com. (1935) 296 US 344.
Swanson v. Com. (1935) 296 US 362.
Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert Associates ( 1935) 296 US 369.
Helvering v. Coombs (1935) 296 US 365.
'Crocker v. Malley (1919) 249 US 223.
'Ibid 234.
'Treasury Regulations 45 and 62, Article 1504.
'Morrissey v. Com., supra, 350.
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"The function of the trustee is not to manage the mills but
simply to collect the rents and income of such property as may be
in their hands, with large discretion in the application of it, but
with a recognition that the receipt holders are entitled to it. subject
to the exercise of powers confided to the trustees. . . The trust
that has been described would not fall under any familiar conception of a joint-stock association whether formed under a
statute or not.' ' (Emphasis supplied)
Differently stated, the income of the trust was not from carrying
on of a going, day to day business. It was not from operations ("the
trustees do not manage the mills"). The income was simply the fruits
of property held in trust. Consequently, the trust under examination
was held not to be taxable as an association or corporation.
Thus it seems plain that, in the very first case calling for determination of the taxable status of a trust in the Federal scheme, the "doing
business test" was made controlling. This fact should be kept constantly
in mind as we progress, because its significance has, apparently, been
overlooked in many later decisions.
This question next came before the Supreme Court in four cases
which were consolidated and decided in 1924. 7 One of these cases was
a second Crocker u. Malley controversy, involving the same trust as
in the first Crocker matter, but the trust was functioning differently than
at first, the trust instrument having been appropriately modified to
permit the trustees to exercise their new powers. Said the Court, in part:
"Since the modification the trustees haue carried on the manufacturing business in substantially the same manner as it was
formerly conducted by the corporation. . . We conclude, therefore, that . . . as petitioners are not merely trustees for collecting

funds and paying them over, but are associated together in much
the same manner as the directors of a corporation for the purpose
of carrying on business enterprises, the trusts are to be deemed
associations .

. .- 8

(Emphasis supplied)

Here again the test was "doing business." The trust was taxable
as a corporation because it was carrying on "business enterprises." It
was an operating economic entity. If it had merely held property and
received and distributed income, as was its situation in the first case, the
trust in the second Crocker case would not have been so taxed. Clearly
the test is found in the answer to the question: What does the trust do?
Does it operate a business? If it does, then, being an association of persons, closely akin to that contemplated by the word corporation, it may
be taxed as a corporation.
'Crocker v. Malley (1919)
'Hecht v. Malley (1924)

SIbid, 149, 161.

249 US 223, 232, 233.
265 US 144.

136

DICTA

Following the Hecht decision, the Bureau of Internal Revenue
abandoned the socalled "control" test, and the lesser Federal courts,
in attempting to interpret the new decision, got into such conflict that
the Supreme Court felt compelled to cover the whole field in the
Morrissey and companion cases decided in 1935, as noted above. It will
serve no useful purpose here to review that conflict. The Morrissey
opinion furnishes a new starting point. 9
In the Morrissey case the trustees were empowered to and did, inter
alia, actually subdivide 42 out of 150 acres of land into lots and sold
the lots, mostly on the installment plan; they sold 3,016 beneficial
interests, both "preferred" with a par value of $100 and "common"
without par value, to 920 different persons and paid salesmen commissions on such sales; they constructed and operated a golf course for
profit, sold the course to a corporation, rented it back and continued
operations. The Supreme Court, held the trust taxable as a corporation
and in the opinion said in part:
".. . we are of the opinion that the trust constituted an
association. The trust was created for the development of a tract
of land through the construction and operation of golf courses,
club houses, etc., and the conduct of incidental business, with broad
powers for the, purchase, operation and sale of properties." 10
(Emphasis supplied)
So far so good. The Supreme Court has been absolutely consistent.
It decided the Morrissey case and companion cases in 1935 on the same
principle that it applied to the first Crocker matter in 1919 and to the
second Crocker matter (one of the cases in Hecht v. Malley) in 1924.
But, in the fullness of its treatment of the question in the 1935 decisions,
the Court entered upon a sort of general discussion of the "resemblance"
of certain trusts to associations, which are taxed like corporations. It
said" that the word association implied associates; that the entering into
a joint enterprise, as the cestuis que trust had in the Morrissey case,
made them associates and that that fact, combined with (a) continuity
of the trust throughout the period limited in the indenture, (b)
centralized management, (c) continuity of the trust despite the death
or withdrawal of members, (d) means for the transfer of shares of
beneficial interest; and, (e) limitation of liability of beneficiaries, made
the Morrissey trust so much like a corporation that it could be taxed as
one. Most of the lesser Federal courts seem to have immediately concluded that these mere attributes of a corporation were controlling,
regardless of whether or not a trust operated a business, and to have
overlooked the other equally significant fact that the Morrissey trust
'Morrissey v. Corn., and related cases, supra, p. 1.
"0Morrissey v. Corn., supra, 361.
'Morrissey v. Corn., supra.
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actually made its taxed income by carrying on a day to day business.
Thus it came about that almost every "voluntary" trust, as distinguished
from (a) a testamentary trust, or, (b) a liquidating trust, is taxed as
a corporation. Cases are legion to sustain this, but the necessity for
brevity here precludes citations.
On the other hand, in a few jurisdictions, what appears to be
the correct view has been maintained. In those jurisdictions it is
recognize that a trust must derive its income from the operation of a
business, as distinguished from income from property held in trust,
before the United States may tax that income as though earned by a
corporation. In one of the best of this line of decisions it was said in
part:
"The word 'business' in its present connection connotes a
commercial or industrial establishment or enterprise. The distinction between it and 'property' must be kept clearly in mind in
applying the taxing statute here. Business in the sense inwhich it
is here used means ...the doing of the varied commercial acts and
taking the requisite steps from which result conclusions and conditions. The mere receipt of income from leased property and its
distribution to cestuis que trustant amounts to no more than
receiuing the ordinary fruits that arise from the otwnership of
property and does not constitute doing business." 12 (Emphasis
supplied)
In view of the revenue law on this question it seems odd that the
distinction pointed out above has been so much overlooked. The
statutes first enacted by Congress in 1928 have continued
without change
13
for approximately seventeen years and are as follows:
"SEC. 161. IMPOSITION OF TAX. (a) Application of tax.
The taxes imposed by this title upon indioiduqls shall apply to
the income of estates or of any kind of property held in trust .... 14
(Emphasis supplied)
"SEC. 162. NET INCOME. The net income of the estate or
trust shall be computed in the same manner and on the same basis
as in the case of an individual...
(Emphasis supplied)
It seems plain enough that the view of the Sixth Circuit noted
above"0 squares with the statute and the Supreme Court's rule."T Not
only so, but in 1941 the Supreme Court itself, in passing upon these
very sections, indicated, at least, that they are controlling. In over"-Cleveland Trust Co. v. Com. (CCA 6, 1940) 115 Fed. 2d 481, 483.
Cert. den. (1941) 312 US 704.
"Secs. 161 (a) and 162, Revenue Act of 1928.
"Internal Revenue Code.
"Ibid.
'Cleveland Trust Co. v. Com., supra.
"Morrissey v. Com. and companion cases, supra.
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ruling the contention of the trustee that the trust there involved was
doing business and referring to and citing Sections. 161 (a) and 162,
the Court said in part:
"... In view of the expressed Congressional command, that
the same method and basis of computation must be applied to
trust income as to individual income, it is doubtful whether any
administrative practice, no matter how clear or long existent,
would warrant us in applying one concept of carrying on business
in the case of an individual and another concept in the case of a
trust.' 18

Such was the decision despite the fact that the trust under examination had a corpus consisting of stocks and bonds which the trustee
from time to time sold and reinvested the proceeds in other securities
with so much success that, despite large distributions of income, the
corpus increased from approximately $7,600,000 in 1923 to about
$10,000,000 in 1931.
Under what circumstances may a trust be taxed as though it were
in fact a corporation? The plain answer seems to be as follows:
(1) Where the income is from the operation of a business;
and,
(2) The trust resembles a corporation in the mode and form
of its organization and operation.
In the absence of these circumstances it does not appear that either
the applicable revenue law 19 or the Supreme Court's rule 20 would permit
imposition of any tax upon a trust except that imposed upon individuals.

Personals
Maj. John A. Carroll, former district attorney, has been released
from active duty. While on active duty he was a member of the allied
military government in Africa, Italy and France, and upon returning to
the United States was associate professor of military government at
Stanford University.
Maj. Ira Rothgerber, Jr., while in Denver recently, told of meeting other Denver men over thirty cases of Coors beer in front of the
Manila Hotel, now destroyed. Lt. Ranger Rogers of the coast guard
was skipper of the FS boat which transported the beer to the point from
which it was taken ashore. Lt. Col. Charles Cooper Young, judge advocate of the First Cavalry Division in Manila, is one of the men whom
Maj. Rothgerber has seen in recent months.
'City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Helvering (1941)
0
" Sections 161 (a) and 162, Int. Rev. Code.
'Morrissey v. Com. and companion cases, supra.

313 US 121,

126.
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Bishop Rice's Last Battle for Civil Rights
A Memorandum for the State Historical Society
BY

FRANK SWANCARA*

There appeared in the Rocky Mountain News shortly before Sunday, February 18, 1945, an advertisement stating, in substance, that on
that day the Bishop would, in the name of the Liberal Church, protest
against the witch-hunting clause of House Bill No. 325.
The assailed clause consisted of the words, "although in every case
the credibility of the witness may be drawn in question." Separated
from its context, the clause seems innocent enough, but it immediately
followed a clause providing that persons shall not be "excluded" as witnesses "on account of their opinions on matters of religious belief."
Therefore the bill, if passed, would have invited lawyers to pry into
private and secret "opinions" on the pretext of testing "credibility."
It happens that these clauses were copied from an existing Colorado
statute,' first enacted in 1883. What it meant in 1883 is clear from the
following statement of a New York court in 1858:
"And when the people declared, in their constitution, that 'no person shall be rendered incompetent to be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief,' they did not intend to say that some
persons may not have such awful religious opinions as to render them
2
less credible as witnesses than others."So the courts, in 1858, held that even without such statutory permission as given by the Colorado statute, credibility could be tested by
questions on the "opinions" of the witness. The Colorado statute of
1883 simply adopted the New York case law of the time.
The Colorado statute of 1883 is cited in Wigmore on Evidence in
connection with the following text:
"Much less, in these days, should evidence be admitted, not of
cacotheism, but of mere disbelief in a personal Deity, i. e., atheism,
-a belief quite consistent with the strictest sense of moral obligation to speak the truth. Some statutes, however, preserve a permission to use such evidence,-a sop of mediaevalism left to satisfy
those who would otherwise have not consented to abolish theologi3
cal qualifications for the oath. "

If the Colorado legislature of 1883 could not avoid the "sop of mediaevalism," surely the sponsors of the House Bill in 1945 could have done
*Of the Denver bar.
]Sec. 1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
'Stanbro v. Hopkins, 28 Barb. 265. 270.
'Sec. 936 Wigmore on Ev. (2d Ed.).
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so, for Dean Wigmore's text goes on to show that "in these days" some
courts "justly reject" that sop.
During the formation of the New York case law, as existing in
1883, opinions regarding theism, monotheism, and hell were "awful"
to persons holding contrary opinions. However, if a witness belonged
to a politically or socially powerful sect or denomination, then no matter
how "awful" his creed might seem to some, no lawyer dared to impeach
him. 4 Judicial notice was then taken of the liberty of conscience. But if
the witness was thought not accepting theism or monotheism, the New
York courts, as late as 189 1, would not protect him. He could not prove
his "credibility" by showing that he had endured the pains of poverty
for the sake of avoiding debt.
When John Most became a witness he was victimized by the practice sanctioned by case law in New York and by such clause as was placed
in House Bill No. 325. He was unpopular because of a speech on behalf
of the Chicago "anarchists," and spoke of "how they were strangled to
death, not properly hanged."- 5 He was co.nvicted under the "Unlawful
Assemblage Act," and on appeal the highest court dismissed as "frivolous," without discussion, his exception to a question affecting his
opinion on a theological subject.,
In 1903 the same reviewing court considered a case where the impeached witness was a respectable business man. One judge said, in effect,
that-in obedience to stare decisis what was sauce, or poison, to the goose
John Most must also be fed to Mr. Cory. However, two judges thought
it both unconstitutional and unreasonable to permit lawyers to pretend
that they are drawing in question the "credibility" of a witness by inquiring as to his presumably, unpopular opinions on the fundamentals
of predominant creeds.'
The purpose of pretending to test "credibility" by questions on
religious, or anti-religious opinions, is to arouse hostility against the
witness on the part of jurors having contrary opinions. How a juror
may act or react is illustrated by the effect of the following question once
propounded to Upton Sinclair:
"Did you not say 'the Eddy Bible is unadulterated moonshine,' and that the organization is the 'church of the full pocketbook'?" 8
Referring to a juror who had heard that question, and who was "a
Christian Scientist," Col. Van Cise said:
'Corn. v. Buzzell, 16 Pick. (Mass.) 153 (1834).
'People v. Most, 8 N. Y. Supp. 625 (1890).
'People v. Most, 27 N. E. 970 (1891).
7
Brink v. Stratton, 68 N. E. 148, 63 L. R. A. 182 (1903).
'36-37 Colo. Bar Assn. Rep. (1934), p. 123.
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"Up came the juror like a huge trout from the depths, gone
was his lethargy, and he sat glowering in his chair.' -'
While Bishop Frank H. Rice was practically alone in placing himself on record as opposing the witch-hunting clause in House Bill No.
325, his protest accorded with both the letter and spirit of the state's
Bill of Rights. Section 4 provides that "no person shall be denied any
civil * * * right, privilege or capacity, on account of his opinions concerning religion," which provision is substantially the same as that which
caused the Court of Appeals of Kentucky to say:
"We think that this provision of the constitution not only
permits persons to testify without regard to religious belief or ISbelief, but that it was intended to prevent any inquiry into that
belief for the purpose of affecting credibility.' 10
That decision had the approval of Dean Wigmore. 1
Of course, if House Bill No. 325 had passed, the clause in question
would have been a nullity, as it is in the existing statute. 12 But the
presence of that clause amounts, in effect, to an insult against individuals
having no fear of supernatural punishments, because of implications
against their veracity. 13 As witnesses, they are placed in a list with con4
victed felons.'

Personals
Lt. Col. John C. Street will serve on the staff of Supreme Court
Justice Robert H. Jackson, chief of counsel for the United States in
prosecuting war criminals in Europe. Col. Street was an attorney for the
Burlington Railroad prior to entering the army. Mrs. Street is the former Helen M. Thorp of the Denver bar and former instructor at the
University of Denver School of Law.
Fred N. Holland has been promoted to the rank of major. Maj.
Holland is officer in charge of the fraud section of the field investigations
branch of the office of dependency benefits. This branch in its three years
of activity has saved more than eight million dollars to the government
in the prevention of payments of family allowances to those not entitled
to them.
'Supra note 8 at p. 124.
'°Bush v. Com., 80 Ky. 244 (1882).
'Supra note 3.
"The modern cases cited in note, 95 A. L. R. 723 and supplements.
"Direct aspersions are found in Odell v. Koppee, 5 Heisk. (Tenn.) 88; Norton v.
Ladd. 4 N. H. 444; and in Stanbro v. Hopkins, cited supra note 2.
14Note the position of the clause, "nor those who have been convicted of crime,"
as it appears in Sec. 1, Ch. 177, C. S. A.
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Upon Information and Belief
The fact that forty-nine concurrent resolutions for amendments to
the state constitution, and two concurrent resolutions (one in the House
and one in the Senate) calling for a constitutional convention, were introduced in the thirty-fifth general assembly is ample evidence that there
is some interest in changing our basic state law. This interest is not confined to Colorado alone. Missouri has just adopted a new constitution.
New Jersey last fall voted upon but rejected a new constitution, and
other states are giving attention to this subject. Among these are Illinois,
where the referendum taken among the members of the bar shows a large
majority in favor of the calling of a constitutional convention in that
state. It is not necessary to accomplish a substantial change in our state
constitution to call a constitutional convention, as the general assembly
may place on the ballot amendments to six articles at any election, and
by amending six articles, a very substantial change can be made.
This is .not true in Illinois, where the legislature can submit amendments
to only one article at an election. Although many in this state favor the
calling of a convention at this time, there are others who feel that if the
general assembly will take the lead and place a number of amendments
on the ballot, constitutional reform can be accomplished without the
calling of a convention.
The amendments introduced in the thirty-fourth general assembly
would have accomplished singly or in combination the following
changes:
Executive Department
Four-year term for state officers; the election by the people of the
governor, lieutenant governor and auditor and appointment by the governor of the attorney general, treasurer, secretary of state and superintendent of public instruction.
Legislatiue Department
Constitutional increase of minimum compensation to members of
the general assembly; the filling of vacancies in the general assembly by
appointment; four-year term for representatives; annual sessions; power
in the general assembly to call itself into special session; prohibition
against members of the general assembly holding any employment in the
state government; elimination of the fifteen-day limit for introducing
bills in favor of a limitation to be imposed by the general assembly;
elimination of the never-adhered-to requirement of a state census in all
years ending in 5; power in the general assembly to divide into districts
any county entitled to more than one representative or more than one
senator; elimination of the constitutional limitation on legal investments.
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JudicialDepartment
Elimination of the constitutional requirement for county and justice courts; requirement that supreme and district court judges be attorneys admitted in Colorado; provision for the interchange of district and
supreme court judges.
Suffrage and Elections
Reduction of voting age to eighteen years; elimination of requirement that ballots be numbered and substitution of a provision that no
ballot may be numbered or identified (this amendment was adopted by
the general assembly and will be on the ballot in November, 1946).
Education
Elimination. of the requirement that each school district maintain
a school; elimination of the constitutional requirement that the board
of education consist of constitutionally designated state officers; fouryear term for county superintendents; appointment rather than election
of regents of the state university; elimination of the prohibition against
the general assembly prescribing textbooks; abolition of board of land
commissioners and creation of office of land commissioner; creation of a
seven-man board of education elected by the people, this board to appoint a commissioner of education in lieu of election by the people of a
superintendent of public instruction.
Revenue
Increase of tax exemption from $200 to $500; elimination of all
earmarked funds with all state revenue going into the general fund to be
allocated by the general assembly; exemption from certain taxation of
service men.
Civil Service
Elimination of department heads; appointment of civil service
commissioners by the supreme court; elimination of civil service commission and creation of personnel director; extending terms of office of
commissioners for fifteen days so that commissioners would be appointed
by the new governor rather than the retiring governor; creation of office
of personnel director; elimination of constitutional provision regarding
compensation of civil service commissioners.
Counties
Four-year term for county officers; officers of counties and their
compensation to be determined by law; home rule for counties.

144

DICTA

Amendments
Constitutional convention when approved by the people to be
called by a committee of five persons, three of whom would be elected
by the general assembly.
Old Age Pensions
Repeal of jackpot provision providing for the surplus old age pension funds to revert to the general fund; repeal of jackpot provision and
retention of surplus funds in the old age pension fund to pay pensions
(this amendment was approved by the general assembly and will be on
the ballot in November, 1946) ; elimination from old age pension funds
of excise taxes hereafter levied; provision for forty-five-dollar guaranteed pension to be appropriated for by the general assembly, and if not
appropriated, to stand as a continuous constitutional appropriation with
the elimination of earmarked funds for old age pensions.
One important constitutional change which was not suggested in
the general assembly, but which has had considerable attention, is a new
method of selecting judges. This program has been before the Colorado
Bar Association for some years, and at the 1944 meeting of the association, a resolution was adopted requesting the president to appoint a
committee to undertake the study of the establishment of a non-political
judiciary, requesting the committee to submit plans for judicial tenure
and selection.
Amending the constitution, or at least the amendment of certain
portions of it, are matters which the bar has always felt were within its
province. We can think of no better way in which the lawyers can
increase their prestige in this state than by taking the lead in causing to
be brought before the people for their approval or rejection amendments
to our state constitution.

New Member of Denver Bar Association
Michael Reidy was elected to membership in the Denver Bar Association May 7, 1945. Mr. Reidy graduated from the University of
Denver School of Law in 1943 and was admitted to practice by the
Colorado Supreme Court that same year, and is now associated with
Messrs. Pershing, Bosworth, Dick 1&Dawson.

Admitted to a Higher Court
Page Morse Brereton of the Denver bar died May 9, 1945.
Brereton was an authority on mining and irrigation law.

Mr.
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Several Hundred Thousand

BY GOLDING FAIRFIELD*
"The indictment charged the defendant with having conveyed his
property, consisting of a farm of 160 acres, to each and every member
of the American Legion of Iowa, each and every member of the Independent Order of Odd Fellows of Iowa, eachand every member of the
Knights of Pythias of Iowa, and each and every attorney-at-law in
Iowa, for the purpose of hindering, delaying and defrauding his creditors.
"That appellant conceived a freakish purpose to prevent his creditors, the mortgagees named, from securing title by foreclosure without
an expense that would make it impossible may be conceded, but it seems
to us that the device by which he sought to accomplish his dishonest
purpose, if sustained, would amount to a legal absurdity.
"The record does not disclose the number of Odd Fellows, Knights
of Pythias, American Legion, or attorneys at law in the state of Iowa at
the time the deed was executed. The existence of these bodies, as well as
the fact that they probably number several hundred thousand persons, is
well known to the court. The moiety conveyed to each member thereof,
if any, was infinitesimal and could not be partitioned in kind. * * *
The expense of executing, acknowledging and recording instruments of
conveyance by the several hundred thousand persons indicated would
many times exceed the value of the farm. * * * It is against the policy
of the law to permit title to real estate to be permanently tied up so as to
entirely clog and prevent the conveyance thereof."
The court held the deed void, that no one was injured and no crime
committed.
State v. McGee, 204 NW 408 (Iowa Supreme Court).
The above case is cited as a guide to practitioners of real estate law.
Too many grantees spoil the deed.
PERSONALS

Lt. Dayton Denious used a part of the time of his latest leave from
Uncle Sam's Navy to attend the May 7th meeting of the Denver Bar
Association and meet his old friends there.
Franklin A. Thayer, deputy district attorney of Denver, has been
appointed by Governor John C. Vivian to the office of State Veterans
Service Officer. He will hold the rank of Captain in the Colorado State
Guard. The State Veterans Service Officer assists persons having claims
to benefits arising under the laws of the United States and the State of
Colorado by reason of military service of themselves or persons upon
whom they are dependent.
*Of the Denver bar.
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